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11. AFRICA AND THE URUGUAY ROUND-CONSTRAINTS, 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND HOPES
1.1 General Introduction
Africa’s participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations was constrained by eco-
nomic, social, infra structural and political factors.  The negotiations took place during the
period when most countries were undergoing structural adjustment characterised by public
sector and civil service reforms.  The public sector had been the traditional source of reli-
able revenues, which could be used to fund, among other things, participation in the nego-
tiations themselves backed up by inter Ministerial co-ordination and appropriate and ade-
quate information.  Resources were not in place to facilitate these processes.  Besides, civil
service reforms took place during the same period of the negotiations.  They involved re-
trenchment of labour and the emphasis was more on cutting numbers than preserving criti-
cal skills1.  Some of the skills, which could have enhanced the continent’s bargaining role
in the negotiations, were shed off during the restructuring process.
In spite of the capacity problems African governments undertook and are still un-
dertaking serious reforms and establishing the necessary institutions to enable their coun-
tries to participate in the emerging world trade regime.  They have done this at a very high
cost and against many odds.  Some of the old problems, which have reduced market access
for Africa’s products, still continue.  These include among others, import restrictions, rigid
quotas, unreliable commodity agreements, subsidies, pricing mechanisms and rigid re-
gional trade arrangements.  These will continue affecting market access for Africa’s prod-
ucts for a long time to come.
In addition to the old familiar barriers to trade, new ones have emerged which
promise to have a longer and deeper impact on Africa’s trade.  They have emerged during
the same period of the Uruguay Round negotiations and early period of implementation.
These are the technical barriers to market access contained in the new environmental
regulations.  They are based on international conventions on the utilisation of natural re-
sources2 and also international environmental agreements on the protection of human and
animal health3.  Some arise from mandatory4 and some from non-mandatory treaties and
recommendations5.  Although the majority are of a regional nature such as those of the EU
2or the OECD, their impact is global because they emanate from the world’s biggest trade
partners6.  This makes these trade partners not only the pace but standard setters and once
they implement them within their own national borders, those seeking to trade with them
have either to comply with them or adopt them in their own countries.
This chapter seeks to evaluate the impact of these regulations on the potential for
market access of Africa’s products to the European market.  The chapter is divided into
five main parts.  Part 1 of which is introduction forms part, examines the factors that con-
strained Africa’s participation in the Uruguay Round, the traditional obstacles to market
access and what African countries have done to increase their market access to European
and other markets.  Parts 2 and 3 will examine the nature, content and requirements of the
new environmental regulations and practices, which have been introduced by the European
Commission.  Part 4 is devoted to consumer standards and international codes of conduct
on responsible management and development of natural resources. Part 5 raises policy is-
sues and conclusions.
1.1 Africa’s Limitations During the Uruguay Round Negotiations
The Uruguay Round of negotiations could not have come at a less opportune time
for African countries.  Institutional, economic, organisational and information related ob-
stacles grossly reduced the continent’s capacity to influence the negotiations and outcomes
significantly.  The major institutional constraints were lack of mobilisation capacity at re-
gional level.  While the African countries were organised into sub-regional blocks, some of
the regional economic organisations such as the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC) and the East African Co-operation (EAC) were being given form, vision and ori-
entation.  Some of the older economic organisations in the Central African sub-region were
beginning to get affected by the rising tensions and conflicts in the Great Lakes while on
the West African side the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was
devoting all its resources to the conflict in Liberia.
At national level most governments were carrying out civil service reforms, which
included reducing the number of ministries, retrenching supposedly excess labour, intro-
ducing new management practices and reforming local government structures.  While these
reforms were shrinking the size of governments and the labour force, they did not contain
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change and the emergence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were among those new
challenges.  The African governments were, in the majority of cases not only ill prepared
but also ill equipped to address them.  This was further complicated by the fact that with
regard to the WTO, the issues involved were wider than conventional trade issues.  During
the negotiations it became very clear that most issues, which lay outside the jurisdiction of
the ministries of trade, were trade issues.  Agriculture, tourism, environment, immigration,
education, culture, manufacture, intellectual property etc. were each covered by separate
negotiations during the round.  At national levels they were still under the jurisdiction of
non-trade government departments.  Co-ordination of information and negotiating posi-
tions required not only experience and skills but also the civil service stability and predict-
ability, which did not exist in many countries.
Human and financial resource constraints obstacles deprived many countries of the
opportunity to even be represented in Geneva.  Many countries still do not have permanent
missions in Geneva where most of the negotiations took place.  Some of the missions in
Geneva are inadequately resourced and have to provide services to several other countries
in Europe in addition to attending to WTO issues.  These constraints made and still make
the contributions of African countries to the shaping of the world trade regime very lim-
ited.  During the preparations for the new round, the OAU UNCTAD, and UNDP made a
big effort to mobilise regional economic communities and the African missions in Geneva
to take a proactive approach, prepare positions on key issues and be ready to spend time
and resources in the new round7.  It is hoped that some of the problems of marginalization
and passive participation, which characterised Africa in the last round, will this time be
reduced or removed altogether.  The Canadian Parliament8 and the Dutch Government9
have expressed the same hope.
1.2 Traditional Barriers to Market Access for Africa’s Products
For the last three decades, Africa’s share of the world’s export market has remained
very low and almost insignificant.  It has even been declining.  In 1970 it was 0.8% of the
global total.  In 1995 it had dropped to 0.3%10. Blackhurst and Lyakurwa11 have observed
that tariff cuts instituted during the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements are
4not likely to increase market access for African products significantly because of various
reasons. Some of the reasons relate to the nature of the products themselves and the export
orientation and policies of African countries.  Others relate to the import policies and prac-
tices of Africa’s trade partners.
The nature, concentration and destination of African products tend to determine
their access conditions.  The nature of exports is characterised by a single commodity de-
pendency12.  Some countries have a dependency of over 90% on one export commodity for
example Angola (94.5% on minerals), Gabon (99% on oil), Nigeria (94.5% on oil) and
Zambia (99% on minerals).13  Most of these are minerals whose quotas are fixed and
whose prices are unstable.  They are exported crude and unprocessed to specific traditional
importers.  Competition within the supply market for these products is very high.  Control
of demand and destination by multinational corporations is very well established. Suppliers
have very little say on the conditions, which shape market access for these products.
The composition of export products also affects market access. Most countries have
not changed the nature, composition or even quality of their products for decades. Ghana
for example has always exported cocoa, cocoa butter, gold and wood products.  Kenya and
Uganda have always relied on tea, cotton and coffee and to that list Tanzania has always
added sisal, diamonds and pyrethrum. Botswana consistently exports beef and diamonds
and the same composition of exports can be ascribed to many other African countries. Due
to this static composition, efforts have always been made to step up production without
accompanying strategies for increasing processing capacity.  Increased production without
diversification has led to over-production in some cases thereby resulting into stagnant
market access and in most cases reduced prices14.  This has led to the problem of the de-
cline in the contribution of traditional exports to GDP. In some countries such as Kenya,
this decline has been very sharp for example from 70% of the GDP in 1980 to 47.6% in
199615.
The trade practices of Africa’s trade partners have a significant impact on its mar-
ket access. Tariffs are still a major obstacle.  Although on the EU market they were already
low and in most of the traditional African product destinations they have been significantly
slashed after the Uruguay Round, some non-traditional markets have retained very high
tariffs.  Coffee, cotton and rubber exports still attract very high tariffs in China and several
5other Asian countries.  Cotton, cotton yarn and textiles encounter stiff tariffs on the North
American market.  Exports of cocoa, cocoa butter, garments and tinned fish are also sub-
jected to high tariffs in Latin America especially Brazil and Argentina, the biggest markets
in that region16.  Furthermore, while substantial reductions in tariffs have been recorded for
major products of interest to Africa, they were marginal on fish and fish products, textiles
and clothing and generally on processed or semi-processed goods17.
Tariff peaks, nuisance tariffs and tariff escalations have always and still continue to
reduce the access of African products on markets of developed countries.  Most of these
tariffs are on products, which have had value added to them through processing or manu-
facture or even simple quality improvements.  They have become a powerful instrument in
the hands of the OECD countries to maintain a primary commodity export syndrome in
developing countries.  They are used as a mechanism of protectionism and serve to per-
petuate the current world division of labour.  It has been predicted by Njinkeu and
Monkam18, that while the average ordinary tariffs facing imports from the developing to
developed countries will be as low as 12% in the Post-Uruguay period, tariff peaks for im-
portant products will rise to an average of 350%.  The most devastating impact of tariff
peaks and tariff escalations will be in the area of processed foods and textiles.  Mwega and
Muga have argued that developed countries are using these as instruments for establishing
trade enclosures.  Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe are already beginning to
absorb the impact19.
In addition the traditional import restriction policies and mechanisms continue to
operate.  Domestic pricing is still a serious barrier to less developed country products in
developed country markets.  Taxation regimes, industrial subsidies and environmental sub-
sidies tend to reduce the price levels for domestic products in many commodities espe-
cially wood products, foodstuffs, animal feeds.  Imports fail to compete because they do
not enjoy the same level of tax preferences and subsidies.  The preferential treatment given
to local products also creates non-tariff barriers to imports.  This is very common in the
area of sugar, which cannot compete with beet sugar and in wines and beverages.  Explicit
restrictions are put on competitive imports through restrictive quotas.  This culminates into
import substitution policies by developed countries, which are at the frontline of disman-
tling such policies in developing countries. Dumping of cheap products from industrialised
6countries is the final outcome of these policies. In the long run, dumping stifles agricultural
development in importing countries and promotes demand dependency.
Direct import bans, regular quarantines or restrictions also affect market access for
developing country products.  In some cases, the reasons for the restrictions are not con-
vincing.  In 1998, the US, for example imposed restrictions on textiles from Kenya on the
claim that Kenya was importing and re-exporting them.   Rules of origin were used but
there was no substantiation and due to power relations and lack of resources, Kenya did
not avail itself of the dispute settlement procedures.  Similarly regular bans of imports of
fish from East Africa are imposed by the EU and the USA either on grounds of health or
other sanitary standards or simply by invoking codes of conduct on responsible fishing or
fisheries management.
Rigid quotas have been used in the Lome Convention and under the various com-
modity agreements, to restrict imports of commodities such as sugar and bananas.  The
quotas for sugar remained predictably static for a long time20.  This has suppressed the ex-
pansion of the sugar industry in Africa and other sugar producers.  The USA was equally
protective and limited the import of sugar, thereby almost stagnating the sugar industry in
the Caribbean21.
While developed countries were enforcing those rigid quotas two things happened
which further aggravated the access of Africa’s products on developed country markets.
The World Bank and the EU continued supporting African countries for crop production
improvement even for crops whose quotas were already stagnant.  Crop improvement pro-
grammes raised the level and quality of production while demand either shrunk or stag-
nated.  Without a supportive increase in demand, the prices crumbled22.  This coincided
with the crumbling of the commodity agreements with products such as coffee and sugar,
depended upon by many African countries, being affected most.  The combination of rigid
and static quotas, funding of over-production thereby depressing prices and the collapse of
the commodity agreements is going to affect market access for a very long time.
Many African countries have not had a chance to examine the potential opportunity
presented by the Uruguay Round against the historical and long established barriers to
trade that may not be removed by the new trade agreements.  As we shall see later, the EU
while negotiating the new GATT agreements intensified legislation on environmental and
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dents for the OECD countries, the transitional economies and other trade partners who
have to cope if they want to remain partners.  African countries have not taken serious note
of these potential instruments of market exclusion.  Instead they have concentrated on pol-
icy reforms.  Before we examine these regulations and their possible lasting effects on Af-
rica’s future, it is essential to look at the reforms African countries have undertaken in pre-
paring themselves to comply with the new world trade obligations.
1.3 Policy Reforms By African Countries
In attempting to comply with the expectations of the Bretton Woods institutions as
well as the World Trade Organisation, African countries have undertaken deep and serious
institutional and policy reforms.  Exchange rate, import policy and tax reforms have been
effected in almost all the countries23.  Some countries have even introduced deeper policy
and institutional reforms in order to prepare themselves to participate in the world trade
system.  Ghana for example has introduced commodity-specific export promotion policies.
In each of these covering the major traditional exports, institutions have been formed, in-
centive packages introduced, quality standards established and notification made to the
WTO about these policy reforms and institutions24.
Trade liberalisation has been taken seriously in many African countries. Crop mar-
keting authorities have been either disbanded or privatised.  The marketing of agricultural
produce has been completely liberalised, prices deregulated and fertiliser subsidies re-
moved25.  Regional economic communities such as the East African Co-operation, the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African Development
Community are working on common policies in agriculture, industry, trade and intellectual
property26.  For most countries, however, the reforms have been carried out at a very high
cost in terms of foregone opportunities such as taxes and duties on the part of the state and
loss of jobs, income and welfare on the part of individuals27.  Although other researchers
feel that Africa’s pace of reforms has not been rapid enough to take most countries out of
their economic crises, it can be argued that given the available resources African countries
have done their best in restructuring their economies28.  However, there is more to be done
especially in the areas of transport, port facilities, tourism and telecommunications29.  Tar-
8iffs for water, telephones and electricity are still too high and tend to inflate the cost of
production in many African countries.
In spite of all these efforts, Africa’s trade opportunities will not only be secured by
policy reforms. There’s need to increase knowledge about environmental standards and
regulations which are proliferating in countries which have formed traditional destinations
of Africa’s products.  These regulations have been intensified during the Uruguay and
post-Uruguay negotiations.  They are part of the new non-tariff barriers and their threat to
Africa’s market access should not be under-estimated.  They constitute of five major com-
ponents: sanitary and phytosanitary standards, product and process environmental policies
and standards, stimulation policies, eco-labelling regulations and codes of conduct on re-
sponsible product management or development.  They will be examined in detail below.
2. PRODUCT AND PROCESS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND 
REGULATIONS
These are mainly concerned with the regulation of health standards.  They cover
products that may be considered directly or indirectly responsible for adverse effects,
which may occur in the production or consumption chain.  In the area of foodstuffs, for
example, the FAO has estimated that in the USA alone, about 9000 deaths and between 6.5
and 33 million illness are caused by food borne diseases.  It has also estimated that in 1994
alone such illnesses cost the US government between USD 9 and 12 bi30.  In the processing
of wood products for example, scientists have established that the use of cadmium and
pentaclorophenol chemicals is harmful to humans, other animals and aquatic life in gen-
eral.  As a result their use in the treatment of timber is restricted if timber is intended to be
used in the European Union.  Similarly the use of creosote in treating wood products is re-
stricted to specific levels and wood products treated with creosote cannot be used inside
buildings or in public places where there is a risk of contact with human skin.  It cannot be
used for packing food products or for the production of breeding trays31.
Product and process policies will pose a very serious obstacle to market access for
African products because they tend to be very comprehensive, covering the whole life cy-
cle of a product.  Many African producers do not have the necessary skills and instruments
to carry out life cycle assessment [LCA].  Life cycle assessment requires advanced skills
9for environmental impact assessment [EIA].  It covers four major stages.  First the primary
or manufacturing stage.  Second the consumption or storage stage.  Third the transportation
including export process and finally the wastage stage.
European companies have taken voluntary measures to enable themselves to com-
ply with process oriented environmental standards.  They have adopted three major poli-
cies.  First they have what are known as ‘Environmental Management Systems’.  These are
quality certification standards under the IS0 9000.  Chambers of industry and commerce
have popularised these standards.  They also encourage companies to record information
on their environmental policies, subject themselves to inspection by competent authorities
and obtain environmental quality certificates, which they use as instruments for marketing
and competition.
In 1995 April, the European Commission established an ‘Environmental Manage-
ment Audit Scheme’ [EMAS].  This scheme encourages voluntary environmental man-
agement audits.  Successful companies are given a special logo that they use for marketing
purposes.  The third voluntary mechanism applicable in the European Union is the ‘Annual
Environmental Report’ through which companies keep detailed records and give account
of their achievements in implementing the international standards for environmental man-
agement [IS0 1400].  Such reports are also required under the EMAS.  In some countries
such as The Netherlands, designated companies are required to present mandatory reports.
Such companies if involved in importing products will always want to import from coun-
tries applying similar standards. In the absence of a concerted effort to upgrade the techni-
cal capabilities of many exporters, African products will increasingly fail to comply with
the product and process standards of the European Commission.
Another process policy with a potential to affect African products is the waste
management policy.  For almost each product there are specific regulations aimed at re-
ducing the environmental problems, which may arise out of disposed products or packag-
ing materials.  Many African exporters are still unaware of these regulations.  But waste
management policies and regulations will affect them, because importers will not accept
products, which do not meet the waste disposal or packaging disposal guidelines.  The
standards set within the EU are very high. In The Netherlands for example, incineration or
dumping is already illegal. Therefore products or packaging materials which require incin-
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eration cannot find market in The Netherlands.
European Union importers are increasingly going for packaging, which is capable
of being recycled.  Most of the products from Africa are packaged in wood rather than pa-
per boxes.  The new EU packaging regulations require that by July 1st, 2001,32:
a. Each manufacturer and importer must be able to recover 50% to 65% of the packaging
materials brought into the market.  Recovery in this context includes 25 – 45% recy-
cling with a minimum of 15% for each material.  It also includes composition and in-
cineration resulting in energy recovery.
b. The packaging has to be such that the packaging and weight are limited to the mini-
mum for purposes of safety, hygiene, consumer interests and acceptance of the pack-
aged product.
c. Packaging must be designed, produced and commercialised in such a way as to permit
its re-use or recovery including recycling.
d. Packaging must be manufactured in such a way as to minimise environmental impact
in the disposal of packaging waste.
e. Packaging must be in such a way that it minimises the presence of noxious and other
hazardous substances and materials with regard to their presence in emissions, ash or
leachate when packaging materials are being disposed of as waste.
Although the directive comes into effect in July 2001, European countries have al-
ready passed legislation to implement it.  Some of them have introduced more strict stan-
dards.  In The Netherlands, for example, the importers and manufacturers had to start re-
covering 65% of the packaging materials brought into the Dutch market by 1st July 199733.
But even without the force of legislation by 1994, over 47% of all packaging were already
being recycled in The Netherlands.  Due to a tradition of tripartite consultations in The
Netherlands, all interested parties agreed upon each policy package on environmental stan-
dards.  French waste disposal regulations aim at a higher standard of 75% recovery by the
end of 2001.  Under French regulations importers and manufacturers are required to take
back their packaging waste.  They can handle their own waste or use the authorised organi-
sations known as ‘Eco-Emballages’.  The French standards have serious implications for
exporters to the French market.  Exporters are also expected to take back their packaging
11
materials.  If they cannot take them back they have to meet the costs of waste disposal.
They may authorise the importers to act on their behalf34.
German packaging regulations are also very strict and comprehensive.  Under the
Packaging Act35, general regulations discourage secondary packaging, encourage multiple
use packing, require packaging with material that can be recycled (preferably paper and
cardboard) and make packaging with polyvinylchloride plastic or CFC foamed parts illegal.
The most important regulations for exporters to the German market are the take back
regulations.  Like in the case of France exporters are required to take back their packaging
materials for re-use, re-cycling or disposal.  The importers are empowered by German law
to enforce the regulations on the exporters.  All exporters are required to comply with the
take back regulations.  In practice, however, the importer or a designated third party can
discharge the obligations of the exporters under contract.
What is the significance of product and process regulations for market access to
European countries?  From the outset it was pointed out that most of these regulations were
developed and put into force during the Uruguay Round negotiations.  By establishing
them at the same time free trade was being strengthened, the European nations were creat-
ing new technical barriers that would ensure they retained an upper hand in world trade.
Together with this they were already setting the pace and rhythm of environmentalism as a
new legitimate mechanism for defining the new rules of trade.  The cultural and scientific
significance of these regulations is also worth noting.  These nations have some of the best
and most advanced scientific institutions in the world.  They have always provided lead
without consulting others and their leadership has always been accepted.  They have used
environmentalism to develop a new set of scientific and technical standards that will be
transferred, copied and applied by all countries that hope to trade with them.  This assures
them of unquestioned technical leadership in the new trade regime.
Product and process environmental regulations have other more significant power
implications.  One of these is that they create joint responsibility between importers and
exporters because processes in the exporter country have a bearing on the liability of the
importers.  Due to this joint responsibility some obvious choices emerge.  Either the ex-
porters can form joint ventures with importers in order to be able to acquire the necessary
technology to comply with the standards or get the necessary legitimacy and acceptance on
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the European market.  The other alternative is for African countries to invite European
companies to invest and operate from Africa because their acceptability on the European
markets is almost guaranteed.
In the area of flowers and fish products, it is becoming increasingly clear that fish
products entering the EU on European fishing vessels or being exported by European com-
panies are assumed to be European and subjected to minimal scrutiny or controls.  The
same is happening in the area of flowers and other horticultural products.  The more the
involvement of European companies the lesser the restrictions.
Joint ventures have always been used to transfer technology and increase foreign
investments.  But desperate attempts to enforce European standards have a potential to im-
pose cultural and political changes on Africa.  In order to comply with strict standards
about fish products, aquaculture has to be more and more privatised.  In order to control
levels of toxicity or pollution, communities may have to be closed out of commercial agri-
culture, forestry and aquaculture.  As is already happening in the case of horticulture,
farms have to be fenced and kept out of reach.  This calls for further intensification of pri-
vate property and trespass laws.  It calls for a new culture, which involves the exclusion of
local communities from all forms of product management or commercial farming.  The
political implications of this are social exclusion, concentration of land in the hands of a
few and garrison economies, fenced and kept out of the reach of the poor.  Viewed from
this angle the EU environmental regulations may become effective instruments of Wester-
nisation or de-Africanisation of Africa’s economy.
The packaging waste retake requirements look simple on their face value.  But they
carry serious jurisprudential implications.  The German law discussed above, for example,
gives power to the importer to enforce the retake or recovery regulations.  First this gives
regulatory powers to the importer over the exporter.  The enforcement of regulations is
taken from the state of export to the importer companies and this gives direct control to the
importer over the exporter.  This power can easily be used to influence export prices or to
reduce export earnings as importers can always deduct some of the money to recover the
packaging materials.  This abdication of the law enforcement obligations from the Euro-
pean states to the importers gives control to the latter over exporters and even exporter
states.  It is also in line with the increasing privatisation of public responsibilities.  In addi-
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tion to the general product and process regulations, the EU has product specific environ-
mental regulations that will affect market access for African products in the long run.
Some of these are examined below.
3. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 
COUNTRIES AFFECTING SELECTED PRODUCTS OF INTEREST TO 
AFRICA
It must be made clear again that, EU regulations are not binding on non-EU coun-
tries.  They are meant to regulate environmental standards within the EU.  But they also
create technical barriers to products from outside the EU.  In this section we shall examine
standards governing foods, especially fresh fruits and vegetables, wood and fish products.
In the case of wood and fish products we shall also examine international codes of conduct
initiated by European countries on the responsible management of fisheries and forests.
The argument is that the standards set unilaterally are too high and have far-reaching im-
plications for power, production and trade in Africa.
3.1 Fresh Fruits and Vegetables
Africa’s potential is beginning to be realised in the area of horticulture.  The main
destination of Africa’s fruits and vegetables is Europe.  Benin, Cameroon, Cotê d’Ivore,
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Reunion, South Africa and Zimbabwe are ma-
jor exporters of passion fruits, pineapples, chillies, avocados, beans and mangoes to the
EU36.  A few environmental regulations passed by the European Commission will affect
the competitiveness and access of African products in this market.  First the regulations
establish ‘maximum residue levels’ [MRLS].  These relate to the maximum concentration
of pesticides in food products.  They are based on what are called by the European coun-
tries, ‘good agricultural practices’ [GAPS].  These GAPS and the MRLS have been set up
by European nations taking into consideration their own agricultural systems and climati-
cal regimes.  Suppliers or exporters to EU markets have either to apply the same standards
in their own countries or give up on trade with Europe.
Until 1995, the implementation of international standards on tolerable levels of
pesticides in foodstuffs was voluntary.  These standards were set jointly by the FAO,
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WHO and Codex Alimentarius Committee.  These international bodies had examined up to
275 pesticides.  But beginning in 1995, European nations have gone beyond international
standards.  While re-enforcing the Codex standards, the principle of voluntary enforcement
has been set aside.  EU Directive EU 76/895 which established the MRLS provides that no
European country can simply depart from the Codex standards without very strong rea-
sons.  It also provides that exporters who cannot meet the Codex standards can with the
help of the importer take legal action to be exempted from such strict standards.  The obvi-
ous problem is that for the majority of developing countries, it will be very difficult to in-
stitute or fund such legal proceedings without wiping out the profits expected from small-
scale trade activities.
Apart from the directive on MRLS, another EU directive37 prescribes maximum
levels of food additives and also lists additives that are acceptable within the EU.  Most of
the accepted are waxes, some chemicals and acids.  For example specific maximum quan-
tities of thiabendazole are prescribed for bananas, and citrus fruits.  The measurements al-
lowed are very elaborate and relate to surface treatment.  Exporters have to ascertain that
these acceptable levels are not exceeded.  The details involved indicate that high technical
skills are required for scanning the products.  This is turn requires advanced and reliable
technologies.  In addition these technologies have to be at the same level with those in im-
porting countries.
In some cases the maximum levels are not specified as for example in the case of
ascorbic acid, sodium and calcium acrobate and in some cases wax treatment.  This appar-
ent flexibility based on vague clauses setting the standard as ‘quantum satis’ or not more
than necessary can be used to impose multiple standards and discriminate against the least
favoured exporters.  Such clauses encourage discretion, which can be abused or used to
impose nuisance non-tariff barriers.  A third area regulated by the EU in the area of foods
is the presence of heavy metals.  Cadmium, lead and mercury are known to be potentially
hazardous to human health.  Since 1991, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg have
established the so-called Benelux requirements covering tubers, yams, beet root, mush-
rooms, fruit, vegetables, root vegetables, legumes and fresh vegetables.  The German
regulations have added to the Benelux list kernels and plant parts and have added thallium
to cadmium, lead and mercury.  Most of the listed products come from the African region.
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Recently African countries have tried to enter the mushrooms market.  In all cases, these
products especially tubers are grown by small scale farmers whose know – how about met-
als is limited.  It seems as in the other cases, the European regulations will push the conti-
nent further into commercial, large-scale, private agriculture.
The control of mouldy foods is another area that will put a strain on Africa’s tech-
nical and technological resources.  Tropical conditions are naturally conducive to the
growth of natural toxins.  Thus there’s an inherent potential for such toxins to affect the
environmental quality of tropical foods.  Although moulds such as fungus are easily de-
tectable by naked eyes, their toxins are not.  Small-scale producers, from whom most of
the export foodstuffs are purchased, do not have the necessary technical and technological
capabilities to detect and control toxic substances in the foods they produce.
National legislation in Europe has already made it illegal to sell food, which is inju-
rious to health or contaminated. This is the goal of every country.  But these regulations
are adding pressure on exporters to the European market, to equip themselves with the
means to control the quality of food exports. One main mechanism encouraged is the con-
trol of humidity levels to control fungal growth.
The EU directive on GAPS requires the use of particular techniques such as use of
seedlings that have not been disinfected, crop rotation, use of fungi resistant techniques,
use of fungicides and the cleaning of fruits and vegetables with fungicides or hot water af-
ter harvest.  These GAPS introduce new rigid standards about best practices in farming.
They ignore traditional or indigenous systems of fungal control that vary from region to
region.  They envisage and favour exports from large-scale, modern and perhaps private
commercial farmers.  In addition, the regulations require drying facilities and climate con-
trol to reduce moisture in storage and transport facilities.  All these require technologies
and techniques, which are recognised and respected in the European countries.  Such re-
sources are not available to the poor farmers who form the bulk of suppliers to exporters.
It will take time before African commercial actors become competitive on the European
markets notwithstanding the substantial reduction in tariffs.
Before winding up on this section it worth commenting on grading of food product
standards38.  These regulate the assortment, size, uniformity, colour, marking, packaging
and presentation.  These regulations are not known to many African exporters and reflect
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the cultural gaps between two continents.  Culturally European consumers accept stan-
dardisation and some adhere to these standards very rigidly.  European and African per-
ceptions of measures and size are determined by cultural values, geographical and ecologi-
cal conditions, family size and other factors. They are not uniform and none of the values
should be taken to be exclusively rational.
3.2 Regulatory Measures Related to Wood Products
Wood products constitute a significant component of African exports to the EU.
Cameroon, Cotê d’Ivoire, Gabon and Nigeria together supply more than 50% of EU timber
and wood product imports39.  Other countries are also key exporters of timber and some
countries depend for more than 20% of their GDP on these products.  Four major types of
environmental regulations exist in the EU, which have a bearing on wood and wood prod-
ucts.  They relate to the use of cadmium, wood preservatives, formaldehyde and packaging.
The EU directive on ‘Restriction on the Marketing and Use of Certain Dangerous Sub-
stances and Preparation’40 sets standards for the maximum levels of cadmium by weight in
wood paints.  At national level the maximum levels allowed in such paints are even much
lower.  The 1993 German legislation on ‘The Marketing and Use of Dangerous Sub-
stances’ establishes higher standards than those set by the EU directive.  The standards in
The Netherlands are even much higher41.
Wood preservatives aimed at controlling fungi and insects are very necessary in the
wood industry in tropical countries.  The EU regulations42, make the use of pentachloro-
phenol, or PCP salts restricted especially for wood intended for indoor purposes.  The
Netherlands and Germany have also restricted the use of these preservatives by national
legislation.  The use of creosote oils in treating wood or the sale of creosote treated wood
with creosote levels exceeding certain limits is prohibited if such wood is intended for use
public buildings, packaging of products or the production of breeding trays43.  A survey of
12 wood exporting companies from Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Tanzania indicates that
only 20% of them were aware of the European limitations on preservatives.  They were all
based in Ghana.  But 60% indicated that some preservatives were unavoidable because of
the climatic conditions.  All of them indicated that even if they were aware of the restric-
tions, they were unable to actually ascertain the levels because of low skills and lack of
technologies.
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3.3 Environmental Regulations Relating to Fish Products
Sanitary and phytosanitary standards have constituted some of the biggest non-
tariff barriers to market access for developing countries.  Fish and fish products have
formed a small battle ground on which trade wars between developed and developing
countries have been intensifying.  Developed countries are still significant exporters of
fish.  Over 80% of the world fish exports are still from developed countries.  Japan alone
accounts for over 30% of the world total fish exports and the US is the second biggest im-
porter while it occupies the third position as the world’s biggest exporter44.  In order to
protect their own interest and to regulate health standards, developed countries are intro-
ducing various quality control measures, which will affect developing countries.
The most effective set of standards has been introduced through the Hazard Analy-
sis Critical Control Point [HACCP] principle launched on the 18 December 1997.  All fish
intended to be sold to markets applying the principle must come from plants with an
HACCP plan.  This principle which has a globalisation mission for standards in the fish
industry, has even been termed by the FAO as the most effective mechanism for tariff es-
calation or ‘a de facto non-tariff measure against value added products originating from
developing countries’45.  The arguments for the introduction and circularisation of the
HACCP which is based on mandatory and uniform procedures for developing, catching,
processing, storing and transporting fish and fish products, apply only to national produc-
tion and imports.  They apply in all OECD countries and other countries dependent on fish
exports have adopted the principles and standards.  Among these are Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Morocco, New Zealand and Thailand that adopted the HACCP principles in order
to retain a share in fish trade markets.
The HACCP regulations have a deeper impact than is readily admitted.  Although
meant for domestic production, they cover imports too.  The US regulation on HACCP
provides that,
‘If assurances do not exist that the imported fish or fishery product has been proc-
essed under conditions that are equivalent to those required of domestic processes
under this part, the product will appear adulterated and will be denied entry’45.
In order to comply with the HACCP principles an exporter has to acquire new plant and
new technologies and has to start completely new production processes.  The resources
required for the installation of new equipment are enormous and cannot be afforded by
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small producers.  The HACCP standards require heavy capital investments and resources
inaccessible by the poor.
The EU countries have adopted the HACCP principles.  In addition they have their
own sanitary guidelines, which are very comprehensive and relate to:
a. Means relating to production i.e. physical installation, construction and equipment wa-
ter quality, disposal of refuse etc.
b. Public health requirements such as hygiene during processing, staff hygiene, mainte-
nance, cleaning and dis-infection in connection with fishing boats, landing sites, proc-
essing plants etc.
c. Product standards relating to freshness, cleanliness, maximum level of microbial con-
taminants, chemicals, toxic substances, parasites etc.
d. Monitoring standards relating to self-monitoring, official monitoring by national agen-
cies and EU monitoring and inspection46.
In order to be given a phytosanitary certificate by the European Commission’s Animal and
Plant and Health Inspection and Control Office, the following are inspected and reported
upon:
a. National legislation especially that relating to the legal powers given to the competent
authorities.
b. The competent authority’s organisational structure, its inspection department, available
staff and materials.
c. A field review of health inspection’s conditions on a number of sites and facilities.
d. An assessment of guarantees by the competent authority in connection with quality and
public health standards as laid down by the European Commission47.
Fish and fish products have been a very difficult area in the trade relations between
the EU and Africa. A case in question is the east African countries. In March 1998 an out-
break of cholera in Mozambique led the EU to slam a ban on fish from all the east African
countries. Three months later, the ban was lifted after the WHO expressed an opinion the
disease causing bacteria cannot be transmitted through hygienically prepared fish or fish
products. In March 1999 the EU imposed a new ban of fish from Lake Victoria after it was
alleged that some fisher people were using pesticides to increase their catches.
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In trying to comply with the new ban the three east African countries invited EU
experts to visit the fishing sites. Several visits were made and a selective lifting of the ban
followed. Tanzania and Uganda were exempted after some time while Kenya continued to
be covered by the ban. Many fishing companies moved from Kenya to Uganda and Tanza-
nia. Kenya was forced to reduce its fishing operations to 20%. The ban was lifted in No-
vember 2000 by which time Kenya was losing earnings worth US$ 50 mil. per annum.
The problem for Kenya is that it could not understand why the ban was lifted for Tanzania
in January 2000 and for Uganda in August while the three countries shared the same lake
environment.
Many African countries are trying to introduce quality control measures but very
few will manage to satisfy the very high standards laid down by the EU.  One easy option
for them to comply is to go into joint ventures with European fishing companies.  This may
be actually the expected result because as the FAO has noted, ‘HACCP can create benefits
not only in causing safer seafood to enter the market place but as a business management
tool and in creating benefits.’48. Some of these benefits could be in the form of joint ven-
tures with OECD countries as dominant partners.
The second option is for African countries through regional economic communities
forming quality control, information and standards units, which can offer support to fish
and fish products exporters.  The Eastern European countries have formed a seventeen
member country network known as ‘Fish Marketing Information Service for Eastern Euro-
pean Countries’ [EASTFISH].  The network, with the help of the FAO offers technical as-
sistance and training on aquaculture production, fish processing, quality control and quality
assurance.  It also promotes exports and joint ventures.
 In May 1999 the FAO gave the East African Co-operation [EAC] about US$2.5
mil. to help the East African countries to improve quality standards of their fish for export
to the European market.  During the same period another US$2.5 mil. was donated by the
EU to COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) to support the Stan-
dards Quality Metrology Project that is aimed at improving the quality of fish exports49.  It
is worth noting, however, that the support extended to African regional economic commu-
nities is not as massive and as well organised as that extended to Asian or East European
countries.  The major difference is that while in Eastern Europe and in Asia commercial
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aquaculture is gaining root with room for direct foreign investments and joint ventures, in
Africa large scale commercial aquaculture is still very limited. The industry is dominated
by small-scale fishing companies and a large number of small fisher folk. Such conditions
do not make the fishing industry in Africa noticeable enough to attract any heavy invest-
ments.
4. CONSUMER AND MARKET ORIENTED ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS
In this section we will examine two types of regulatory mechanisms that EU have
developed in order to strengthen their producers by stimulating a culture of environmental
consciousness.  After this we will take a brief look at the international codes of conduct
development under the stewardship of EU and other OECD countries which lay the basic
best practices in environmental resource development and management.  These two sets of
environmental regulations have enabled the importers and producers in developed coun-
tries to dictate the pace, rhythm and conduct of international trade in key areas globally.
4.1 Stimulation Policies Aimed at Creating Environmental Competitiveness and 
Trade Monopoly
The EU is leading on importer incentives aimed at stimulating competitiveness and
institutionalising environmental values and standards at global level.  The three major in-
struments in this area are financial incentives, eco-information systems and eco-labelling
procedures and standards.  Financial incentives include eco-taxes and the new Green Gen-
eral System of Preferences [the GGSPS].  Eco-taxes operate by sanctions and penalties.
They make environmentally unsound products and production processes attract higher
taxes.  A fuel tax or pay as you pollute charges have been on the table of the EU for almost
half a decade now and due to resistance from some European countries no general policy
has emerged.  But lead treated fuel attracts higher prices in some European countries due to
the tax component.  Low energy products attract low tax rates.  In the area of waste and
package waste disposal higher tax rates for high energy consuming products operate as
non-tariff barriers for products from developing countries with higher fuel and energy
costs.
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Since 1998 the EU introduced the concept of an ‘encouragement regime’ based on
a 20 to 30% additional import tariff preferences for ecologically friendly and humanly
sound products.  The human aspect relates to child labour, social protection and trade un-
ion rights.  Human rights generally have crept into the EU trade regulations in spite of the
fact that the social clause is still being resisted by developing countries as part and parcel
of the world trade standards.  By introducing an encouragement policy of this type, the EU
has introduced new trade conditionality in the world trade regime.  Much as human rights
have to be finally accepted as part of the corpus juris of the WTO standards, a unilateral
encouragement policy is calculated to pre-empt discussion on the social clause in the forth-
coming millennium round of negotiations.
Eco-information systems are another set of instruments developed by the EU to en-
hance competitiveness among European companies on the EU market.  European compa-
nies are encouraged to keep detailed information on product components, environmental
characteristics, consumer preferences and their eco-label records.  It is a comprehensive
product cycle information system, which is supposed to make the market more accountable
to consumers.  But the aim is to show consumers the environmental effects of the proc-
esses used in the development of particular products.  The effect is, however, to preserve
the superiority of European products and to compel exporters to the EU markets to comply
with EU standards.  Because the data sheets are used to obtain eco-labels as certificates of
excellence, they are, in fact, used both as marketing techniques and as non-tariff barriers to
products from outside the EU.  Suppliers of raw materials have no choice but to bear in
mind the requirements and expectations of European consumers.  For African exporters
many limitations abound.  First, they have not been involved even at the level of the Lome
IV framework, to contribute to the development of these standards.  Second, they are faced
with environmental standards, which ignore their structural capacity for compliance.
The third mechanism is the eco-labelling system.  The European Union has facili-
tated the development of eco-labelling as a marketing and business tool.  Manufacturers
and traders, who have used eco-information systems as a marketing tool, have been al-
lowed to develop their own private eco-labels.  These private eco-labels are given to or al-
lowed to be used by companies with a strong track record on environmental standards.
Private companies have been quick to establish themselves as leaders on environmental
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quality.  Some of these include garments manufactures and wholesalers such as Espirit and
Steilman50.  In addition to private eco-labels there are a number of national eco-label sys-
tems.  Nowhere are eco-labels more effective as tools of monopoly and exclusion as in the
area of textiles.
In spite of the new agreement on textiles, eco-labelling seems to present a strong
barrage of non-tariff barriers that will keep textiles from developing countries out of the
European markets.  By 1996 Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden had passed stringent
regulations limiting the use of azo dyes, pentachlorophenol, flame retardants, polychlori-
nated biphenyles (PCB), and terphenyles (PCT), cadmium, asbestos, formaldehyde and
nickel in the manufacture of garments51.  When introduced in Germany and The Nether-
lands in 1996, they immediately affected the import of garments from developing coun-
tries.  Most of these countries have no indigenous systems of production.  They have been
depending on purchased technologies and systems from European and American compa-
nies.  The new technological revolution that has swept the textile industry in developed
countries came as a surprise to developing countries.  The same developed nations that
have transferred environmentally unsound technologies to the South have introduced new
regulations banning products produced through processes now considered harmful to
health.
The new eco-labelling legislation has been popularised through an aggressive envi-
ronmental consciousness campaign.  In addition a string of environmental quality control
institutions of a public and private nature have mushroomed covering even the most min-
ute details in the manufacture of textiles.  The EU eco-labels for baby and adult garments
for example, are concerned with the use of dyes, pesticides and pigments.  There are about
six EU ecolabels.  But Germany alone has more than 25 eco-labels systems, The Nether-
lands about eight, the Scandinavian countries together eight and in addition Sweden has
about 8 systems52.   In addition to general product and process labels, organic labels are
emerging both as a marketing tool and as instruments of screening imports and where they
do not meet European standards excluding them from the market or taxing them highly
thereby making them more expensive.
The eco-labelling system has been more intensified in the area of textiles.  After the
dismantling of the Multifibre Agreement with its quota-based system, advanced nations are
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trying increase their dominance by selling textiles to developing countries while barring
the latter from doing the same in their own markets.  During the era of comparative ad-
vantage, they transferred static textile technologies to developing countries, lent money to
these countries to purchase and set up the textile factories that use the same dyes and pig-
ments, which are now being outlawed.  African countries, whose textile industries have
been exporting Europe, will find these regulations difficult to comply with because they
imply establishment of new plants, shift in technologies and development of eco-scanning
systems.  With the debt burden and the pressure from developed countries to privatise
public textile industries, such massive investments cannot be undertaken in the short run.
4.2 Codes of Conduct on Responsible Management of Environmental Resources
Most of the regulations discussed in section 3 are legislative and administrative.
They can be enforced through non-market mechanisms such as customs inspection and
procedures.  But market mechanisms are not enforced through administrative procedures.
The market enforces them.  The market in terms of choice however, has not generated
some of these.  They have been administratively engineered, they are voluntary but they
have been circularised and made part of consumer culture.  A very outstanding example is
the FAO Code of Conduct Responsible Fisheries, the CCRF.  Another one is the Interna-
tional Tropical Timber Organisation (lITO) policy on sustainable forest management.  The
EU has become a front runner on the enforcement of these two policies and their implica-
tions for exporters from developing countries have been ignored.
The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was drafted at the request of
UNCED member countries53.  It was adopted in 1995 and is mainly devoted to the envi-
ronmental, social and economic impact of shrimp culture.  Problems addressed by the code
include the siting of ponds in mangrove areas on the one and the issue of benefits accruing
to local communities arising from the citing of ponds in mangrove areas on the other. Oth-
ers include the need to ensure shrimp culture does not exhaust the capacity of creeks, the
need to preserve lagoons and near coastal waters, the nutritional and socio-economic and
cultural impacts of conversion from agriculture to aquaculture and related issues54.
The code outlines in detail the basic standards of practice and behaviour for respon-
sible fishing beyond shrimp culture.  The standards cover fisheries management, fishing,
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operations, aquaculture development, and integration of fisheries into coastal area man-
agement, post harvest practices and trade and fisheries research55.
Some of the problems of the code are inherent in the process through which it was
developed.  For a UNCED project, one would expect that the process would have involved
thorough survey of practices and limitations abundant in the FAO member countries.  This
does not seem to have been done.  Berg and others56 have noted other problems.  They
have pointed out the lack of institutional and legal support and capacity to carry out the
obligations prescribed by the code57.  Lack of adequate information by FAO member
countries on the code has also been pointed out58.  The FAO has also pointed out that the
so-called ’good practices’ are those recognised by the consumers and retailers59.  The code
is not oblivious of these limitations.  Article 4 calls for co-operation between member
states and governmental and non-governmental bodies within these states to ensure the
successful implementation of the code.  The code envisages the introduction of a voluntary
scheme to accept and implement its provisions.
The basic limitation of Article 4 lies in its generalisation of the interests and objec-
tives of the main stakeholders.  NGOs will necessarily be interested in conservation.  Gov-
ernments will have an interest in regulated utilisation and the private sector may be inter-
ested in conservation, but it has little interest in regulation and is more interested in ex-
ploitation for gain.  While Articles 6.13 and 6.16 call for participatory frameworks in the
planning and utilisation of fishery resources involving industry, fish workers and environ-
mental organisations in fisheries management, the divergence of interests between all ac-
tors including lending agencies is not given any serious consideration.
Article 5 seeks to address the technical and technological limitations of developing
countries by calling for measures and efforts to redress the deficits of developing countries
in the areas of financial and technical assistance, technology transfer, training and scien-
tific co-operation and human resources development.  But as in all cases of special and dif-
ferential treatment (SDT), the code falls short of establishing financial and institutional
mechanisms for redressing these deficits or deficiencies in the short and long run60.  In ad-
dition the convention prescribes obligations which developing countries especially the
least developed will be unable to implement.  These include the obligations to train and
promote awareness on responsible fisheries61.  Some of the standards expected are beyond
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the reach of small economies. An example is ‘responsible development and management’
under Articles 9.1.2 and 9.1.5 which also refer to advanced evaluation of environmental
effects [EIPA] and regular monitoring.  These require advanced scientific infrastructure
and information.  Some least developed countries cannot mobilise the necessary resources
to meet such requirements.
Other obligations relate to responsible selection and use of appropriate feeds, feed
additives and fertilisers or manure62.  Responsible harvesting refers to harvesting methods
that retain quality and safety and preserve the environment.  Article 11 refers to responsi-
ble utilisation, which has to take into account the consumers’ right to safe, wholesome and
unadulterated fish and fishery products.  The Code also links up with the existing
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission’s standards.  But if the aim is to protect
health and reduce fish borne diseases, the code will only be enforced by countries with the
necessary means to put into place the infrastructure required for these excellent standards.
African countries generally, do not have such capacity. If the aim is globalisation of stan-
dards in fish products the code will operate as an instrument of exclusion.
The last set of consumer oriented international codes is the Code on Sustainable
Forest Management.  The EU has taken lead in developing a policy that allows only the
sale and distribution of wood products made out of sustainably managed forests.  For a
long time it has operated a system of voluntary certification.  Taking cue from the EU, the
International Tropical Timber Organisation [ITTO] has laid down criteria for determining
the standards for sustainably managed forests.  Two systems for international certification
of sustainably managed forest systems have been established.  One of these is based on IS0
1400 63.  The Forest Stewardship Council, in existence since 1991 has also established its
own standards for eco-certification.  At the frontline of these developments are Austria,
The Netherlands and Denmark.  They have together succeeded to push for a Multilateral
Framework Agreement on Tropical Timber, which was signed in 1996 and came into op-
eration on the 1st January 2000.
Bilateral agreements have followed from the framework for example between The
Netherlands and Cameroon and Gabon.  These agreements have been used to entrench the
standards laid down by advanced countries.  They require among other things, information
to be recorded and kept, on the felling of trees in forests in which social and ecological as-
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pects are important.  They call for action to ensure sufficient growth of trees and they al-
low timber from natural or primary forests if assurance is given that the quality of forests
and the eco-systems are not damaged.  Such criteria is skill and information intensive, re-
quires good information storage systems, institutional mechanisms for enforcing standards
and all these require substantial resources.
5. KEY POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
It may be wrongly implied form this article, that the author is opposed to environ-
mental regulations. Environmental standards are necessary for the preservation of health
and the quality of life.  But they need to be developed jointly by the international commu-
nity, take into consideration variations in economic, social, cultural and environmental
systems.  Developing them without consulting and involving millions of people across the
globe whose livelihoods they will permanently affect, violates the same values of partici-
pation, consultation and democracy which advanced countries use to distinguish them-
selves from other nations.
Unilateral action becomes suspicious when environmental regulations are taken se-
riously only in the areas of trade but completely ignored when it comes to issues of climate
change. The recent failure of the UN Conference on Climate Change in The Hague has un-
dermined the credibility of the majority of the developed countries as regards the impor-
tance they attach to environmental issues.  The first issue is therefore that of coherence.
Developed nations need to be coherent in their major policies if they want to enjoy legiti-
macy as leaders and role models in global policy.
Together with the issue of coherence, there is need for the EU countries to decide
whether and how they would like to help developing countries to institute changes in their
systems of production. The question is whether they would like to help their trade partners
to change their systems in a systematic and phased manner or in the same radical and po-
tentially disruptive way in which most structural adjustment programmes were introduced.
This is because of the most of the trade related changes have more far reaching effects than
can be seen from the surface. Some of these effects are discussed below.
For example, in order to meet the standards established unilaterally by the ad-
vanced countries, systematic and comprehensive environmental management systems will
have to be developed.  Laws will be required and changes in policy will have to be made.
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Such policies and laws may entail promoting large-scale commercial agriculture, aquacul-
ture and civiculture.  These policy shifts have serious implications for small communities,
indigenous people and small producers.  They have serious implications for communal
versus individual ownership.  Control systems will have to be instituted whose impact may
include restriction of movement through forests and waters, enclosures of farming areas,
introduction and enforcement of draconian trespass laws and restriction of small producers
from eking a living out of their natural habitats.  Such policies carry potential for cultural
disruption and even social and political disorder.  Many African countries are already
caught up in environmental and resource conflicts and wars64.  Very few can afford the
cost of such reforms that may intensify resource conflicts.
More challenging and problematic is the issue of enforcement of standards. In
many developed countries enforcement of environmental regulations and standards has not
been very easy although climate conditions have been supportive.  Montague65 has shown
that after a quarter of a century of environmental regulation health standards have been
deteriorating in nine industrialised nations.  These are nations with the best scientific infra-
structure and expertise, high levels of literacy and reasonable systems of sanitation and
waste disposal.  Many countries in Africa don’t have such endowments and suffer from
hazard-prone climate.  Environmental interactions are more complex in Africa than in
Europe.  Farmers differ from country to country and region to region.  Characteristics, be-
liefs and practices of small fisher people, small traders and other groups of producers are
highly differentiated.  Patterns of livelihood have an effect upon and are affected by the
available natural resources.  Enforcing uniform systems of land use and water use man-
agement and standard environmental policies without resorting to repression and authori-
tarianism will be difficult.  Yet the latter options constitute a prescription for community-
state conflicts and violate human rights and democratic governance, values the interna-
tional community has vowed to preserve.
It is worth noting that African countries are not opposed to the improvement of the
quality of life through appropriate health and sanitary standards. On it own initiative the
Organisation of African unity has passed the ‘Bamako Convention On the Ban of the Im-
port Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazard-
ous Wastes Within Africa’ ion 1991. The Convention established a comprehensive re-
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gional mechanism for the implementation of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. It also incorporates
the spirit and provisions of Article 39 of the Lome IV Convention (Article 39) on the in-
ternational movement of hazardous wastes and radioactive wastes. Individual governments
such as those of Namibia and South Africa have passed local regulations and policies for
the implementation of the Bamako Convention. This implies that they are ready and will-
ing to comply with international conventions and regulations. But they need to be sup-
ported technically and in a phased manner to create the necessary conditions for such com-
pliance.
The new environmental regulations add to an already long list, new substances that
need testing for toxic levels. The EU directive on compounds that can be used for colour-
ing paper, for example, has six lists of compounds covering about 146 substances restricted
in the colouring of paper and another about 153 for the treatment of writing materials66.
Although for legislators their work is done as soon as they pass the legislation, for the sci-
entific community the addition of new items to the list is an enlargement of a nightmare.
According to Montague67, the US National Toxicology Programme has only capacity to
study a maximum of twenty-five chemicals per year and even in the area of pesticides, it
has not managed to cover more than 50% of those in use.  If that is true, what capacity do
developing countries in general and African countries in particular, have which can enable
them to ensure exports comply with the European standards or to challenge the decisions
of European governments in case their products are arbitrarily barred from entry or quar-
antined?
The answer is obvious.  Such regulations can only perform three major functions.
One, they can become instruments of integration which can be either voluntary or by ne-
cessity.  Voluntary integration can occur if other countries have enough will and resources
to adopt the standards and adopt their products and processes of production to them.  This
option is closed to African countries.  Integration by necessity will occur when African
countries will invite European companies to work with them or to operate from their terri-
tories in order for their products to be accepted on the OECD markets.  This may be the
hidden agenda of the EU and indeed all developed countries within the WTO framework.
The second possible function that the regulations can have is the leeway function.
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Regulations will be used more as a sword than as a shield.  They will remain in place with-
out being strictly enforced but will be enforced either for tariff escalation where imports
indicate value added by processing or for retaliation against refusal of permission to Euro-
pean companies to invest or repatriate their profits.  They may also be selectively used to
force countries into broader free trade arrangements.  Hence they can be used to reward co-
operating nations or to punish slow, uncooperative or hostile trade partners.
The best role they can perform is the socialisation function.  The regulations can be
used to raise global environmental awareness, conscientise developing countries to the ne-
cessity of upgrading their systems and offer financial and technical support to popularise
them and train for environmental and technology scanning and forecasting.  If adequate
resources and time for transition were set aside for a gradual process, these regulations
would go a long way to promote competitive co-operation and co-operative competition in
world trade.
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